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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Timothy Pressley was charged with aggravated assault allegedly committed by
threatening to do violence by releasing a pit bull breed dog at the alleged victim. The
jury was instructed that if they found that Mr. Pressley either threatened the victim or
attempted to commit a violent injury upon the victim, the jury must find him guilty of
aggravated assault.

Because the jury was instructed on a means of committing the

crime for which Mr. Pressley was not put on notice that he would have to defend
against, he asserts that there was a fatal variance in the jury instructions and this Court
should vacate his conviction. In response, the State asserts that there was no variance
because "the factual basis for the charge was the same from the beginning to end."
(Respondent's Brief, p.7.) For the reasons articulated below, the State's assertion is
without merit.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Pressley's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
Mr. Pressley denied his right to a
instructions allowing the jury to convict Mr.
charged with committing?

2

by the district court's erroneous
of criminal conduct
was not

ARGUMENT
Mr. Pressley Was Denied His Right To A Fair Trial By The District Court's Erroneous
Instructions Allowing The Jury To Convict Mr. Pressley Of Criminal Conduct He Was
Not Charged With Committing
The State asserts there is no variance in this case because the "factual basis" of
the charge - releasing the pit bull - is the same under either theory of criminal liability.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.4-10.) However, releasing a pit bull, without a criminal mental
state, is not a crime. Had the State merely proved that Mr. Pressley released the pit
bull, the State would have failed to prove that Mr. Pressley is guilty of any crime, let
alone the crime of aggravated assault. The State's argument fails because releasing
the pit bull was not the only "fact" that it had to prove, in order for Mr. Pressley to be
found guilty.
Idaho Code § 18-114 states that "In every crime or public offense there must
exist or union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negligence." I.C. § 18114.

In layman's terms, this means that in order for an act (or failure to act) to be

criminal, the person committing the act (or failing to act) must do so with a certain
mental state. Idaho Code § 18-901 is consistent with this axiom as it defines assault as
follows:
An assault is:
(a) An unlawful attempt, coupled with apparent ability, to commit a violent
injury on the person of another; or
(b) An intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the
person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing
some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such
violence is imminent.
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I.C. § 18-901. Whether swinging a stick, pointing a gun, or releasing a pit bull, a person
is not guilty of assault unless their act is accompanied by a mental state - either an
unlawful attempt to commit violence 1 or the specific intent to threaten to do violence. 2
The State appears to be asking this Court to hold that a variance does not occur
where there is a disparity between the allegations in the charging instrument and the
jury instructions, so long as that disparity only affects the defendant's mental state, and
does not change the acts alleged. The State cites to no authority for this proposition.
However, in State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 721 (1993), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected
this very notion, albeit in dicta. In a footnote, the Court recognized,
Given instructions should as a matter of course be tailored to fit the
complaint. It is also important to note that Given Instruction No. 5 advised
the jury that one of the elements of the offense of what we hold to be firstdegree torture murder is that Charles Tribe tortured his wife "with the
intent
cause suffering, to
vengeance, to
something
from
Tribe, or to satisfy some sadistic inclination." This
element of the instruction clearly was overly broad because it presented
four possibilities to the jury, any one of which could be the one upon which
the jury reached its verdict. Where the charge of the amended
information only accused Tribe of having tortured with an intent to
cause suffering or to satisfy some sadistic inclination, that should
have been the full extent of that element. This additional language

1

In 1939, the Idaho Supreme Court held that assault under the "attempt" theory does
not require that the defendant specifically intend to commit a violent act upon the victim;
rather, such a charge may be maintained under a criminal negligence theory. State v.
Patterson, 60 Idaho 67 (1939). Although it appears that Patterson has not yet been
overruled, as Judge Lansing noted writing for the Court of Appeals in State v. Crowe,
[T]his Court doubts the continuing viability of the Patterson rule in light of
more recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions indicating that guilt of
"attempt" crimes requires intent to commit the "attempted" offense. See
[State v.] Buckley, 131 Idaho 164, 953 P.2d 604 (1998) (holding that intent
to kill is a requisite element of attempted second degree murder); State v.
Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 558, 873 P.2d 800, 812 (1993) ("[T]here is ... the
crime of attempt to commit a crime, in which case the state bears the
burden of proving that the defendant intended to commit the crime.").
State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 46 (Ct. App. 2000).
2 See State v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 442 (Ct. App. 2009).
4

further muddies the waters
to whether all
acted with requisite intent, thereby
case
a
between the instructions
the charge of the prosecutor's
amended information. Since Given Instruction No. 5 was given at the
State's request, it would seem to bear some responsibility for the variance
Id. at 725, f.n. 5 (emphasis added).

recognized that a variance occurs

Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court has implicitly
the acts alleged are the same, but the mental

state the prosecution is required to prove varies between the charging instrument and
the jury instructions.

The State, however, essentially asks this Court to adopt the

opposite holding, and it does so without making any compelling argument as to why it
should.
In Idaho, a prosecutor cannot prove that the defendant committed a

merely

by proving that the defendant committed a proscribed act; rather, the prosecutor must
also prove that when committing the proscribed act, the defendant had the requisite
intent (or criminal negligence). Mr. Pressley was charged with committing assault by
threatening to do harm to Mr. Brekke - he was not alleged to have committed the
assault through the alternate means of actually attempting to harm Mr. Brekke.
(R., p.27.) The jury instructions required the jury to find Mr. Pressley guilty if they found
he acted under either theory. Thus, there exists a variance due to a disparity in the
language contained in the Information and the language contained in the jury
instructions. See State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327 (2011 ); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479
(Ct. App. 2013).
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CONCLUSION
Mr.

that this Court

his judgment of conviction and

remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 22 nd day of May, 201

JA
N C. PINTLER
D /,puty State Appellate Public Defender
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